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Abstract: Human beings are deeply social, and both evo-
lutionary traits and cultural constructs encourage coop-
eration based on trust. Social robots interject themselves
in human social settings, and they can be used for decep-
tive purposes. Robot deception is best understood by
examining the effects of deception on the recipient of
deceptive actions, and I argue that the long-term conse-
quences of robot deception should receive more atten-
tion, as it has the potential to challenge human cultures
of trust and degrade the foundations of human coopera-
tion. In conclusion: regulation, ethical conduct by produ-
cers, and raised general awareness of the issues described
in this article are all required to avoid the unfavourable
consequences of a general degradation of trust.
Keywords: deception, trust, culture, social robots, coopera-
tion
1 Introduction
When social robots are introduced into human environ-
ments, they are embedded in a highly complex web of
social structures and mechanisms. Social robots can be
programmed to mimic basic human social norms and
behaviors [1,2]. However, their social interactions are
marred by a deceptive approach to the social aspect of
human relations [3,4]. In this article, I examine how
deception by way of social robots can disrupt and change
human social structures and degrade the foundations of
human cooperation. While most attention has been paid
to the short-term and direct ethical implications of robot
deception, I here broaden the scope of the analysis to
include medium- and long-term consequences and effects
beyond the particular individuals involved in situations
where deception occurs.
Human beings are intensely social. Our radically
social nature has led to human cultures based on wide-
spread cooperation [5]. In modern western societies, the
default behavior is based on a culture of trust.¹ Williams
[7] further notes that trust is a “necessary condition of co-
operative activity.” Trust is a dangerous thing, however,
when it is misplaced. It leaves us vulnerable to deception,
as trust can be breached.
Human behavior is the result of the interplay between
biology, evolutionary adaptions, and culture. Despite the
differences between these foundations of behavior, they
tend to pull in the same direction – toward cooperation
[8]. Evolutionary traits can be analyzed both at the indi-
vidual level and at the group level. At the group level,
survival of strong groups has led to the evolution of traits
that promote group efficiency. Strong individuals are
easily conquered by groups of individuals who are indi-
vidually less fit for survival but strong due to social alli-
ances [9]. While human beings evolve, cultures evolve
more rapidly [6]. Evolutionary game theory shows how
traits such as trust, and other foundations of cooperative
behavior, can evolve in various social settings [10]. Simi-
larly, unfavorable settings, and environments with hos-
tile social settings, may lead to the degradation of trust
and cooperation [6]. How deception can lead to such
degradation is the topic of this article, and the mechan-
isms involved are discussed in more detail after we have
established an understanding of what deception is and
how robots can be used for deception.
Culture can be understood as amechanism that promotes
group success and survival by promoting cooperation [8].
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Culture is used to describe shared patterns of, among other
things, norms, values, and attitudes [11]. Valsiner [12] notes
that culture is also a loaded term, and that it can also be seen
as a way to separate us from them– a way to divide people
into groups. In this article, I focus on culture as humanity’s
way to adapt more rapidly to new challenges than evolution
would allow for [6]. Culture lets us counteract our biological
and instinctual behaviors as these evolve too slow for our
rapidly changing environments.
The environmental change I focus on is the introduc-
tion of new entities capable of activating human social
mechanisms and eliciting social responses from us. Social
robots are examples of such entities [3,13]. If social robots
disrupt human social mechanisms when embedded in
social settings, this is an example of how evolutionary
traits and social responses can make us vulnerable, while
culture and social norms may aid us in coping with the
introduction of new entities in our environments. The
result, however, is also that our culture and social norms
need to change in order to account for these new entities
and that these changes may also have effects for human
social affairs. How robots can change the human culture of
trust is one aspect of robot ethics that has not received
much attention in previous literature.
Humans have, however, also evolved the capacity to
deceive, along with many other primates [6,14–16]. What
is labeled tactical deception requires advanced social
cognition, and it requires organisms to be able to attri-
bute minds to others and to partly simulate these minds
of others [14]. Gorelik and Shackelford [17] also argue
that human technologies might in turn “display cultural
manifestations of deceptive” adaptions. Evolution may
have rewarded deceptive behavior and thus promoted
the deception and manipulation of our rivals [17,18].
However, people prefer not to lie and deceive, and the
pleasure deriving from our own gains from lying is par-
tially offset by the pain experienced by inflicting losses on
others [19].
An intuitive and common assumption is that decep-
tion leads to a degradation of trust. However, some argue
that deception may, in certain cases, increase trust. They
show how prosocial deception, which we return to in
Section 2.2, can lead to increased trust and increased
cooperation in certain games [20]. Robot deception is
similarly argued to be conducive to efficient and benefi-
cial human–robot interactions (HRIs), and the literature
on robot deception details many reasons to deceive as
well as reflections on the ethical challenges associated
with such deception.
I argue from an approach to agency that considers
humans to be responsible for the actions of social robots
[21]. Technically, a robot cannot deceive, but it can be
the tool of deception, and thus the humans involved in
the production and deployment of social robots are ulti-
mately responsible for the consequences social robots
have on the culture of trust. In addition to this, under-
standing robot deception requires us to understand the
effects of deception in the victims of deceptive agents
rather than the action of the deceivers [4]. Robots’ effects
on human culture and trust result from the effects on
targets of deception, and not factoring in effects may
partly stem from an unfortunate tendency to exclusively
focus on the deceivers.
Responsible social robotics requires that we do not
create robots that exploit human sociability to the degree
that human trust, and thus sociability, will be reduced as
a consequence. This could occur through both individual
and groupmechanisms, as (a) individuals learn and become
less cooperative once they are deceived and (b) robot decep-
tion may degrade trust through changing human culture
and evolutionary pressures.
I begin by establishing the concept of deception,
before robot deception is examined in more detail. Lastly,
the potential consequences of robot deception for human
cooperation and culture are discussed.
2 Understanding deception
A working definition of deception is a necessary prepara-
tion for examining the consequences of robot deception. I
first examine some of the key definitions and terms asso-
ciated with deception. I then briefly establish why deception
is not all bad, and that understanding prosocial deception is
required for understanding the nature of deception.
2.1 The concept of deception
Deception is a concept that can be applied to a wide
range of human activities, and a categorical denounce-
ment of deception seems impossible in a world with
a plethora of social relations, play, and fun. Deception
is, nevertheless, potentially problematic for a number of
reasons. Williams [7] provides two important reasons not
to deceive: (a) it involves a breach of trust by the deceiver
and (b) the deceiver manipulates the deceived. Trust is a
relational concept, and a working definition entails that
trust is present when one entity expects another one to do
as expected. It is also often used in situations in which
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the one that trust relies on is the trustee [7]. Levine and
Schweitzer [20] distinguish between benevolence- and
integrity-based trust. The first entails the reputation for
goodness on the part of the trustee, while the latter entails
“the belief that the trustee adheres to a set of accept-
able ethical principles, such as honesty and truth-
fulness” [20].
As already noted, humans generally expect truth and
dislike deception [22]. Truthfulness most naturally relates
to the verbal action and communication of what the com-
municator knows to be factually correct [22]. As people
expect to be told the truth, we become susceptible to
deception. Levine [23] proposes the truth default theory,
which emphasizes that people are inclined to believe
others unless good reasons not to are provided. They trust,
or expect, them to tell the truth. Communication is also,
in general, “based on a presumption of truth” [24].
Deception is by some said to involve misleading
others into believing something we do not ourselves believe
in [25]. It can be achieved through “gesture, through dis-
guise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence”
[26]. It is often used to describe behavior, particularly when
the behavior is “fraudulent, trickly, and/ormisleading” [27].
Knapp et al. [27] emphasize the importance of context in
determining what is deceptive and what is, for example,
good-natured play. Deception then is defined by “the way
people perceive certain features of communicative acts in
context” [27].
Lying is the use of verbal or written statements in
order to achieve deception, and, as such it is a subset of
deception [26]. As lying, unlike deception, requires language,
it is a uniquely human phenomenon, and this is why
Hobbes [28] describes language as a key reason why
humans are plagued by a range of conflicts not experi-
enced by other social animals.
Some, like Vrij [29], defines the attempt to deceive
as deception regardless of the success of the attempt. I will
not consider deception to have occurred unless the attempt
was successful. We might still speak of deceptive behavior
as the attempts to achieve deception, even if we do not
know, or care about, the actual outcomes. As such, a plan
to deceive is not deception, but it can be deceptive.
Of equal importance is the potential requirement of
intent, present in all the definitions of deception referred
to above. According to Frank and Svetieva [30], lying is
always intentional but deception is not. Deception is here
taken as any action that misleads someone, and this, as
we shall see when I turn to social robots, may easily occur
without the intention to mislead.
What Byrne and Whiten [14] refer to as tactical
deception involves “acts from the normal repertoire of
the agent, deployed such that another individual is likely
to misinterpret what the acts signify, to the advantage of
the agent.”While tactical can be taken to imply a rational
conscious approach to deception, this definition does not
necessitate an intent to deceive.
I emphasize the distinction between the approach of
focusing only on the deceiving agent and including the
effects it has on the target of deception [4]. This is
achieved by relying on evaluations of the result of the
deceptive action. By focusing on the target, the criteria
of intentionality become less important. Rather than
focusing on the intentions of the deceiver, the expecta-
tions and experiences of the target are what matters. As
established in the introduction, human cooperation is
based on initial expectations of truthfulness in most non-
combative situations. Unless the context makes it reason-
able to expect deceit (such as when we watch a theater
play or play games based on deception), the target’s
expectations of nondeceit are taken as a standard basis
of interaction. As already noted, this focus on the deceived
is crucial for understanding some of the medium- and
long-term effects of deception.
Deception only involves betrayal when there is an
expectancy of truth, with the accompanying trust that
nondeception is the norm in a given relationship. This
is where deception connects with culture and social
norms. For example, on a market in parts of the world,
it would not be considered betrayal for a seller to claim
that the price of a product is much higher than it actually
is. Such behavior could be the normal form of interacting
between seller and buyer, and the buyer is expected to
know this.²
2.2 Prosocial deception
While deception usually comes with negative connota-
tions, it is not all bad, as deception has a range of useful
functions in human social settings. When we go to see
a movie, actors pretend to be something they are not.
When children play, they do the same. Many games are
built upon the very premise of telling and exposing lies

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that there are also interesting variations at different levels of society.
I will not pursue specific cultural constellations of trust and sociality
in this article.
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and deception. Clearly, not all deception is wrong, as
Coeckelbergh [32] emphasizes as he argues that we should
see deception as a neutral– or even positive– phenomenon.
Furthermore, social norms often entail the suppression of
true feelings and emotions or exhibiting dishonest ones. The
little white lies that we all tell can be considered necessary in
order to avoid conflict. Lies and deception can be beneficial
and prosocial.
“White lies” can be told for the benefit of the liar
alone, or for the benefit of both liar and the lied to. One
example is how a manager can be overly positive when
giving employee feedback, which can result in improved
performance and better relations in the workplace [33].
Furthermore, if my partner asks me if the outfit they try
on for tonight’s dinner looks good, I might think that it is
best for both of us if I simply answer yes, without endea-
voring to be entirely truthful and comprehensive when
relaying my thoughts.
Such lies may seem innocuous, but I argue that even
these lies come at a cost. The lies will often be accepted,
but both parties will most likely be aware of the game that
is being played. Consequently, such lies have the conse-
quence of eliminating one’s own partner as a real judge of
outfits, should there ever be a need for that. White lies
may not reduce trust in a person in general, but they will
reduce trust in particular areas.
3 Social robots and robot
deception
Trust is essential for human–human cooperation and is
also essential for human–robot (and human-automation)
cooperation [34,35]. Trust is also intimately connected
to deception, as it “plays an important, but often over-
looked, role in the development and maintenance of trust”
in machines [36].
Social robots are used for various purposes, such as
entertainment and companionship, therapeutic purposes,
and even love and intimacy [37–39]. Some parts of the
deception that I discuss in the following might also be
applicable to robots that are not particularly advanced,
due to our tendency to anthropomorphize technology
[40–42]. I focus on social robots in particular, as social
robots are most problematic due to their explicit aim of
interacting with human beings and thus taking advantage
of the various human instincts and norms of social
behavior [3,32]. Anthropomorphism is discussed in more
detail in Section 3.4.
3.1 Attribution of deception
First, a key question: can robots own actions? The ques-
tion of robot agency is widely debated, and Bryson [43]
and Bryson et al. [44] argue that giving robots agency –
even in the form of limited legal personhood – is proble-
matic. In the following, I assume that robots cannot own
their own actions and that some human being is always
responsible for the acts of a robot [21].
In this framework, a robot that makes a deceptive
statement is not considered the source of this statement –
some human is held responsible. A robot may be an arti-
ficial person, and an actor, but it is not considered
a natural person. A natural person is always considered
the author of the actions of an artificial person [21,28], the
producer, the distributor, or the owner who deploys it.
As such, robot deception is more properly understood
as human deception by way of robots. The sophistication
ofmodernmachines– a veil of complexity [21]–may obscure
the source of responsibility, but it does not fundamentally
change how responsibility should be attributed. Even if
the future actions of a machine are fully unknown, and
unknowable, to the human responsible, they are respon-
sible, as they have designed the machine in a way that
makes it unpredictable [21].
In some respects, social robots can be said to be
sycophantic [3]. A sycophant is someone who acts in a
certain way in order to curry favor and not because of some
inherent desire to act theway they do. Social robots are often
designed and programmed to please and promote certain
behavior in the humans they encounter. Not on the basis of
some internal desire in the social robot but in order to
achieve some predetermined goal created by its designer.
Robot deception thus refers to deception by robot,
and robots are merely the vessel of deception. They are
akin to advanced costumes worn by a designer in a mas-
querade. This implies that when someone refers to someone
being deceived by a robot, the one deceiving is actually a
human being. Proper attribution of responsibility is required
both for purposes of legislation and regulation and for
making the general public aware of what robots are, and
are not, capable of. The latter point relates to a potential
avenue for facing the threats described here and will be
further discussed in the conclusion.
3.2 Why designers deceive
Facilitating effective interaction between humans and
robots is one of the primary objectives of the field of
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HRI [35,45–47]. We have already seen how prosocial
deception can function as lubrication in human–human
interactions (HHIs), and deception is perhaps even more
important as a lubricant in HRI, if the goal is to make this
interaction more humanlike. Many potential benefits are
to be reaped from robot deception, and these depend on
how we define benefits and whose benefits we focus on
[48–50]. The argument of the article is not that all robot
deceptions must be eliminated, but that in order to
understand how to regulate and face this phenomenon,
we need to understand the medium- to long-term societal
consequences of such deception. For example, Arkin
et al. [46] suggest that a deceptive robot may be better
at inducing a patient with Alzheimer’s to accept what is
deemed a proper treatment. They go on to use interde-
pendence theory to decide when a robot should deceive
and state that “deception is most warranted when the
situation is one of greatest interdependence and greatest
conflict” [46].
One prime example of a cooperative mechanism in
human and animal social settings is that of joint atten-
tion, which is dependent on using gaze as a method of
communication [8]. While a robot does not need eyes that
mimic human functionality in terms of visibly pointing to
objects of attention, much research is devoted to how
robots can perform social eye gaze [45]. A robot need
not use its “eyes” for perceiving its visual environment,
but it can still simulate social eye gaze functions, such
as eye contact, referential gaze, joint attention, and gaze
aversion [45]. If these functions are merely superficial
attributes implemented to elicit a certain response from
humans, they may be deceptive. Eye contact, or mutual
gaze, also increases the levels of trust between humans;
and studies show that imitating human features and
encouraging anthropomorphism in general are beneficial
for human–machine trust [13,51]. This makes the inten-
tional design of such features highly relevant to issues of
trust and deception. Anthropomorphism is discussed in
more detail in Section 3.4.
Another example is how robots that do not disclose
their true nature to human opponents are able to achieve
higher levels of cooperation in prisoner dilemma games
than more honest machines [52]. Short et al. [53] also show
that making a robot cheat in a game actually increases social
engagement and encourages anthropomorphism. Further-
more, Almeshekah [48] shows how deception can be used
to enhance the security of computer systems, including
robots. While human trust can be increased by deceptive
measures, too much trust has also proven to be potentially
problematic. Exaggerated trust in robots– often referred to
as the problem of overtrust –may, for example, lead to
dangerous situations as people trust a robot giving poor
advice rather than their own judgments [54,55].
Coeckelbergh [56] notes that it might be beneficial for
robots to adhere to certain ideals of nondeception, but
that, in general, classical human ideals may need to be
negotiated to facilitate effective HRI. While fully acknowl-
edging the potential benefits of robot deception in order
to create better user experiences and facilitate coopera-
tion, my emphasis is on the potential long-term and
broader consequences of robot deception for human trust
and cooperation.
3.3 Typologies of robot deception
A fundamental premise in this article is that robots can be
used for deception. This is also widely accepted in the
field of HRI, where robot deception is acknowledged, and
the focus is more on when and how a robot can be used
for deception than if it can be deceptive [36,57]. While
Arkin et al. [46] consider all “false communication that
tends to benefit the communicator” as deception, there is
a need to distinguish between various forms of deception.
3.3.1 External, superficial, and hidden state deception
Danaher [58] examines robot deception and divides it
into three forms: external state deception, superficial state
deception, and hidden state deception. When a robot tells
a lie, it deceives you about something external to the robot
itself. It may, for example, tell you that it will most likely rain
tomorrow, even if it knows that the weather will most likely
be fine. This is external state deception, and an example
would be a lying robot [59,60], regardless of whether the
lies are white or the deception prosocial.
When a robot emits signals that imply that it has
capacities or characteristics it does not have, we have
superficial state deception. This could be the case if the
robot was, for example, programmed to appear sad when
it delivered bad news to a human. This might be per-
ceived as the presence of some form of empathy, even
if there is no trace of empathy or sadness to be found in
the robot. This kind of deception might be crucial for
facilitating efficient HRI, but it is nevertheless deceptive.
Another example would be simulated social eye gaze.
Eckel and Wilson [61] show how facial expressions have
clear effects on perceived trustworthiness. This is an
example of how social robots may easily be designed to
take advantage of subconscious social mechanisms in
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human beings. Such signals have evolved to promote
social efficiency. Human nonverbal actions are sources
of “leakage” or “deception cues” [62]. Robots can be
designed to (a) not display such cues or (b) exploit
such mechanisms in order to deceive even more effec-
tively [2]. The later could involve, for example, a poker
playing robot giving false tells, implying that it is bluffing
when it is not. When social robots use and exploit the
potential of such signals, the signals’ value for human
beings are reduced, and responding to them in traditional
ways becomes potentially harmful.
The final form of deception involves acting in order to
conceal some characteristics that the robot actually has.
Kaminski et al. [63] use the example of a robot that turns
its head away from you – leading you to think that it
cannot “see” you –while it has sensors and eyes that
can record at any angle. When this occurs, the robot
acts a certain way to hide its true capabilities, and this
is hidden state deception.
Danaher [58] argues that superficial and hidden state
deception are different in important ways, and that
hidden state deception is the most worrisome and con-
stitutes what he calls betrayal. He also argues that the
two forms are often conflated and that this conflation
makes us miss important nuances of robot deception. It
is important to separate them, he argues, because super-
ficial state deception is usually not problematic, and
actually not deception at all. He bases such a view on
the theory of ethical behaviorism, which implies that
simulated feelings are in a certain respect equal to gen-
uine feelings, and that we should focus on the outward
states of actors since we do not have access to the inner
minds of humans or machines. This is contrary to the
approach of, for example, Turkle [64], who portrays
human feelings and relationships as authentic, and the
robot equivalents as somehow inauthentic or fake. As
noted by Coeckelbergh [56], however, it may be more
fruitful to examine what constitutes appropriate human–
machine relationships than to focus on vague notions of
authenticity.
If a robot fakes empathy, it can be perceived as actu-
ally empathizing, according to Danaher’s [58] ethical
theory. If we disregard the inner states of entities, robot
deception is similar to acts of courtesy between human
beings, for example, and he argues that there is no reason
we should treat such behavior from robots as different to
that from humans.
Some have argued that focusing on the relational
aspects of HRI, rather than what we and robots are,
allows us to better understand the mechanisms at play
and ethical implications of these interactions [32,65,66].
This approach is well suited for analyzing how robots
trigger and enjoy human social mechanisms and can thus
help show the breadth and depth of the consequences of
robot deception.
3.3.1.1 The problem of “If not A, then B”
However, there is a conceptual difficulty involved in
Danaher’s separation between the two forms. My objec-
tion is that actively signaling the presence of characteris-
tics one does not have involves concealing the character-
istics one actually has. When a robot fakes empathy, it
conceals the lack of it. If a robot is programmed not to
respond to questions immediately but appears to ponder
such questions– perhaps holding its chin with fake puzzle-
ment – it hides its true capacity for instantaneous rea-
soning. If it fakes physical pain, it conceals its physical
nature and immunity to the same.
Superficial states and hidden states are connected,
and people necessarily draw inferences about hidden
states from the superficial ones. The conflation of the
two is bad for certain analytical purposes, but when it
comes to deception, separating them may not make
things as clear as Danaher hopes. I argue that both forms
are deception, and I also argue that both forms may be
conceived of as betrayal.
Danaher approaches the problem from the perspec-
tive of ethical behaviorism and a focus on the deceiving
agent. Arkin et al. [46] similarly note that they “focus on
the actions, beliefs, and communication of the deceiver,
not the deceived,” without justifying this choice. I have
argued that focusing on the one deceived is of more
interest when analyzing the ethical implications of robot
deception. What a robot actually is, and does, is of less
interest than how robot deception influences human
behavior and culture.
3.3.2 Full and partial deception
Focusing on the recipient of deceptive acts, I introduce
two forms of deception connected to Danaher’s superfi-
cial and hidden state deception. I label these full decep-
tion and partial deception. These two categories aim at
describing the results that occur in human beings who
encounter social robots.
When a person believes that a social robot is not
a robot, full deception has occurred. The person fully
believes, at both a conscious and a subconscious level,
that the machine is not a machine, but a human being,
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an animal, or something else distinctively different from
its true nature. The machine passes the Turing test of
the human involved [67]. The difficulty in achieving full
deception depends as much, or more, on the individual
being deceived as on the deceptive actor. As such, context
matters, and the result in the individual at the receiving end
of deception is of great importance.
The second form of deception is the one I am most
interested in, and this occurs when a human being has a
rational appreciation of the nature of the device it inter-
acts with but at a subconscious level cannot help reacting
to it as if it is real. Partial deception occurs when social
robots elicit emotional responses as if theywere alive, even if
we know that they are not. Turkle [64] and Darling [68]
discuss this phenomenon in detail. This is similar to the
effects on behavior we see from various social cues from
nonlive sources, such as the decrease in antisocial behavior
in the presence of a poster with a pair of eyes [69].
Partial deception is related to the idea of the “the
willing suspension of disbelief” [70] and self-deception.
However, our subconscious responses are, per definition,
not voluntary, and thus deception at this level cannot
be categorized as fully encompassed by the term self-
deception.
3.4 The problem of anthropomorphism
Human beings are “compulsive meaning makers” [12].
We enter the world, and we fill out the blanks, so to
speak, as we only perceive what our senses provide us
with, but the blanks are filled with our creations. As
gestalt psychology has demonstrated in a number of fas-
cinating ways, we humans have a way of finding meaning
and completeness in the incomplete. The relevance of
such considerations is that the designers of social robots
create somewhat incomplete entities, with suggestions of
similarities to human beings, animals, etc. When people
encounter these entities, they happily fill out the blanks,
but the blanks may be filled with deeply human charac-
teristics, even if the entities in question are little more
than a plastic shell with an engine inside [71].
Darling et al. [72], for example, show how human atti-
tudes toward robots are influenced by encouraging anthro-
pomorphism through providing robots with stories and life-
like movement. On the other hand, anthropomorphism may
lead to an exaggerated belief in the capabilities of artificial
intelligence on the part of humans, and it may also hinder
the proper evaluation of the state of robot development,
as human beings do not objectively evaluate robots for what
they really are – instead, they “find intelligence almost
everywhere” [71].
Encouraging anthropomorphism can be both super-
ficial and hidden state deception, and the benefits of
making humans see robots as more – or less – than they
really are include, but are not limited to, facilitating effec-
tive HRI, using robots to test human psychological and
social mechanisms [71,73]. This leads some to argue that
designers “should consider the incorporation of human-
like features as a deliberate design choice” [13], while
others argue that designers must take steps to account
for both intended and unintended deception, or “nonin-
tended illusions” [32].
One objection to the argument presented in this
article is that deception by robot is unproblematic and
the result of anthropomorphism. As such, robot decep-
tion is akin to the people deceived by the shapes of
Heider and Simmel [74] or pretty much any other device,
as shown in the classical book by Reeves and Nass [40].
The fact that other devices can also be deceptive
is no excuse for intentionally, or neglectfully, causing
such deception by robot. A key ethical aspect related to
robot deception is thus how to signal actual capabilities
and to counteract human tendencies to anthropomor-
phize technology.
4 Discussion
We have seen that human beings are deeply social and
cooperative and that trust and deception are central
to understanding our social nature. We have also seen
how robots are highly effective vessels of deception, and
the main argument proposed in this article is that the
medium- and long-term consequences of such deception
on a cultural and social scale must be considered.
Much attention has previously been devoted to the
benefits of robot deception for HRI, and the ethics com-
munity has examined many of the problematic aspects
of deception. However, most of the latter has involved
narrower limited short-term, direct, or individual conse-
quences of robot deception, while I have here argued that
there are medium- to long-term consequences on a cul-
tural level that might also be important.
The argument is that in societies built on trust and the
expectancy of truthful signals of both superficial and hidden
states, repeated deception will erode this trust and change
the culture and social norms. This, I argue, is one reason
why robot deception is problematic in terms of cultural sus-
tainability. The degree to which trust is affected by robot
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deceptionmust be subjected tomore thorough philosophical
and empirical research, and this must involve examinations
beyond those focused on individuals or dyads. Twomechan-
isms that support the notion that robot deception may be
detrimental to human culture of cooperation and trust has
emerged in this article. The first involves partly well-known
short-term effects related to individual learning while the
other details long-term group-level dynamics related to cul-
ture and evolution.
4.1 Fool me once…
First, we can assume that deception will have consequences
on the individuals being deceived, if we simply assume that
individuals learn. When people trust, and are betrayed, they
will be less likely to trust again. This is a rational individu-
alist approach to trust, and culture is affected by the level of
trust exhibited by its individual members. Such changes can
occur rapidly, even within a generation.
As noted byWilliams [7], long-term consideration about
the favorable consequences of being trustworthy inclines
people against deception. If a person deceives, he may not
be trusted again. We are inclined to assume truthfulness in
our initial meetings with others in neutral or familiar setting
[23]. Axelrod and Hamilton [75] famously showed how
applying the simple strategy of tit for tat could be respon-
sible for the evolution of cooperation. This involves starting
with trust but then subsequently punishing any violations of
that trust with noncooperation. This reciprocity-oriented ver-
sion of trust, however, often requires a high degree of trans-
parency, and this has important implications for the design
of social robots intended to foster, rather than degrade, trust.
The general idea is that people learn and that there
are strong mechanisms of reinforcement involved in human
social settings. Trust and cooperation are fundamental for
human society, and breaches of trust are not only rationally
remembered but accompanied by strong biological mecha-
nisms which make sure that such transgressions are not
easily forgotten [6].
4.2 Cultural devolution
When established institutions become unreliable or corrupt,
trust is withdrawn, with suspicion of strangers, familiars, and
even family members becoming the standard. [6]
Trust and cooperation are, as we have seen, dependent
on certain conditions of transparency and punishment,
and it is built gradually over time. The culture of trust
describes cultures in which the just mentioned institu-
tions exist and are relatively stable. This culture can,
however, quickly be broken. If social robots make insti-
tutionalized cooperation unreliable or corrupt, the conse-
quence can be cultural change. It is important to note
that the withdrawal of trust described by Churchland
[6] is generalized, and not necessarily restricted to the
causes of the corruption of institutions of cooperation.
This means that HRI will have spillover effects to HHI.
Exploiting trust in human–robot relationships might thus
lead to less trust between humans, and examining the
relationship between trust in HRI and HHI is thus an
avenue for future research.
Second, when deception is based on exploiting social
proclivities, individuals less sensitive to social cues will
be less vulnerable to deception, and thus evolutionary
dynamics may lead to a general degradation of sociality
based on trust. As evolutionary pressures have selected for
cooperation and trust, an increased tendency to deceive, for
example by robot, may change such pressures and reward
distrust and noncooperative behavior [6].
This mechanism may have effects even if individuals
are not aware of the deception that takes place, and even
partial deception may thus lead to a changing culture of
trust. Such change, however, is much slower than the first
mechanism described.
5 Conclusion
Since I argue from an approach to agency that considers
human beings as responsible for the actions of the social
robots we know today, the producers of social robots
become the target of my examination. A robot cannot
deceive, but it can be the tool of deception, and thus
the humans involved in the production and deployment
of social robots are the ones responsible for the conse-
quences of social robots on the level of trust in our cul-
tures. The individual and group mechanisms described in
the previous section deserve more attention in the litera-
ture on robot deception, and the consequences of robot
deception on human trust and human culture must be
studied both theoretically and empirically. Much atten-
tion has been paid to important theoretical ethical con-
siderations and the direct results of robot deception, but
this article has highlighted another important facet of
such deception. Combining these is required for attaining
a complete understanding of the societal implications of
robot deception.
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Two approaches are often proposed for solving the
issues discussed here: (a) regulation and (b) ethical pro-
ducers. Regulating the social nature of robots is a difficult
task, yet the potential consequences of robot deception
necessitate increased and sustained efforts both to under-
stand and regulate such deception. As shown in this
article, designers of social robots have many incentives
to produce robots that are deceptive, which implies that
self-regulation by the industry alone will tend to be in-
sufficient.
There is, however, one other avenue to be pursued
for responsible robotics – one in which both the academic
community and media is crucial. This is a bottom-up
approach to responsible robotics, which implies that we
must first seek an understanding of the both short- and long-
term consequences of deceptive robots and then educate
people on these effects. Human beings must be armed
against the potential danger, and increased awareness has
two effects: (a) it decreases the chances of being deceived
somewhat, as one may actively counter it (even the partial
deception) and (b) it will affect the demand for such robots.
As self-regulation seems utopian, and regulation of anthro-
pomorphic features is exceedingly difficult, and might never
become perfect, social pedagogy aimed at disarming social
robots of their deceptive arsenal seems to be both a neces-
sary and valuable pursuit that has received too little atten-
tion thus far.
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